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Introduction 
In the 1990s, the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region has 
undergone fundamental changes. Since the end of the 1980s, security 
concerns about modern arms acquisitions have increased in North- and 
Southeast Asia due to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons 
(WMD) and of  advanced high-tech conventional weaponry. While the 
traditional significance of ground forces has been reduced, naval and air 
forces of most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have rapidly been 
modernised and, therewith, have improved their power projection 
capabilities. These trends are reflected in the defence planning of China, 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan as well as in planning by Southeast Asian 
countries. Within a decade or less, several modern navies and air forces 
could join the US Navy in patrolling the South China Sea and Philippine 
Seas. Those seas could, however, be a very inhospitable wartime 
environment for major naval combatants. Every part of them could 
become within range of aircraft and surface-to-sea missiles based on 
islands on all sides. Therefore, even the US Navy - despite its greatly 
                                               
*
  This analysis is based on findings of a research project at the Research 
Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin.  
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enhanced intelligence, air defence, and anti-missile capabilities - needs 
to adjust its future operations to take into account this new reality.  
These strategic trends are the result of a complex security 
environment in Asia-Pacific, high economic growth rates and the fact that 
modern weaponry acquisitions have become more easily affordable due 
to the end of the Cold War and to shrinking military budgets in North 
America, Europe and Russia. All leading arms manufactures in the US, 
Europa and Russia are competing vigorously for the smaller regional and 
global arms markets that, ultimately, have threatened multilateral arms 
control efforts. While so global defence budgets have been reduced since 
the beginning of the 1990s, East Asia - together with the Persian Gulf 
and the Middle East - is the only region in the world that has significantly 
increased its defence spending. Thus the region is approaching an 
unprecedented arms race, fueled by new economic growth and an 
increasing globalization of security policies, and partly driven by inter-
regional and global dual-use technology transfers. 
In contrast with Europe and the Soviet-American strategic relationship 
during the Cold War, however, arms control policies continue to rank low 
on East Asia’s agenda.1 
The Asian financial crisis 1997-98 has resulted in drastic cuts to the 
defence budgets of those countries most affected such as South Korea, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. Despite some postponements of 
weapons acquisitions, the Asian financial crisis has, simultaneously, 
halted and fastened a process of force modernisation. At the same time, 
the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor and increasing piracy 
attacks in Southeast Asia have also highlighted and exposed structural 
and organisational weaknesses in Southeast Asia’s military capabilities. 
Confronted with these exposed weaknesses and negative impacts on 
defence modernisation, countries in the region have begun to adjust to 
the crisis by re-evaluating their defence modernisation needs. While 
transnational security challenges such as drug smuggling, illegal 
migration or environmental degradation seemed rather peripheral until 
the outbreak of the Asian crisis, governments are responding meanwhile 
by utilizing military forces to cope with them. However, given limited 
defence resources, regional military forces might be tempted by drug 
profits and other forms of corruption. Nonetheless, during the last 
decade, civil-military relations have improved significantly in a way that 
armed forces have become more supportive to democratisation as the 
examples of Taiwan, Thailand and even Indonesia are demonstrating — 
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even when it is to a different extent. Hence fears of military coups have 
subsided gradually albeit one cannot completely exclude those coup 
d’etats in countries such as Indonesia or North Korea in the foreseeable 
future. As a new military mission, the increasing military involvement in 
humanitarian and disaster relief missions is thus not only growing in 
Europe, but in Asia-Pacific too. The professionalisation of the armed in 
the region gives them new tasks and offers many advantages, including a 
new legitimacy in the 21st century.  
But the continual `Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA)’ also poses 
severe complicating factors by increasing the costs of defence 
modernisation and the time of effective military training. Peacekeeping 
and peacemaking operations, as East Timor and many others cases 
have demonstrated during the last years, require, for instance, much 
more inter-service and regional cooperation for effective and successful 
missions. Furthermore, despite this positive evolution, the possibility of 
interstate war and conflict cannot totally be negated for the time being. 
Thus the costs for both, traditional warfighting missions and new military 
operations for peacekeeping and peacemaking are extremely high and 
will increase further.  
Although a number of positive trends in domestic and economic 
policies can be confirmed, the future regional stability remains rather 
unpredictable, due to inherent dynamics of political and socio-economic 
transformations in domestic policies of many countries in the region, 
unfolding at the end of the 20th century. Moreover, these first positive 
steps are part of a longer and deeper socio-economic transformation 
which will only succeed when transformation strategies are supplemented 
by coherent political reform aiming at the establishment of genuine 
democracies, pluralist societies. In this regard, the verdict on the longer-
term sustainability of the present recovery is still open. 2 
Against this background of sometimes contradicting trends in the 
regional military postures and civil-military-relations, defence spending is 
increasing again according to new data.3 The following analysis reviews 
the arms modernisation processes in the 1990s both before the Asian 
financial crisis and its impact on them. Special attention will be given to 
China’s conventional and nuclear armed forces which are deeply 
influence security perceptions of regional as well as external powers that 
have interests and involvement in Asia-Pacific. A final chapter will 
analyse the implications of the renewed modernisation efforts on the sub-
regional and regional military balances. 
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Strategic trends of arms modernisation efforts before 
the outbreak of the Asian crisis 
 
During the last decade, almost all armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region 
have acquired new military capabilities as they have focused increasingly 
on maritime security issues instead of internal affairs as was their 
previous pre-occupation. They have acquired advanced combat aircraft, 
modern warships, state-of-the art missiles, and other modern weapon 
systems with increased accuracy and range that have transformed their 
armed forces into more deadly military organisations. The focus of their 
weaponry acquisitions already involved smart weapons, electronic 
warfare systems, infor-war countermeasures, stealth technologies, 
remotely pilot vehicles, in-flight refueling, anti-missile defences, and the 
development of airlift and sealift capabilities for their newly created Rapid 
Reaction Forces. Simultaneously, the boundary between increasingly 
lethal conventional weaponry and weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons (WMD) is being effectively erased and 
becomes less and less important from a military standpoint. Moreover, if 
the economic and technological infrastructure of the East Asian states is 
further modernised, their industrial capabilities will also increase to adopt 
most modern technologies from abroad.   
Thus far, Western experts were divided in their opinions whether these 
arms procurements in East Asia could already be characterised as an 
`arms race` or merely as an `military build-up`, a `military modernisation 
process` or an `arms competition`.4 Any full scale assessment of the 
ongoing military buildup has to look at the following three basic 
components of an integrated, long-range strategic design of the East 
Asian states: (1) arms purchases/military spending, (2) military 
organisation (military structures, doctrines and strategies), and (3) military 
industrialization. In this light, only a careful and deeper analysis in a 
broader concept of shifting defence policies can deliver adequate 
answers. Such an analysis has to take into account the shifting 
geopolitical and geostrategic landscape, threat perceptions (and other 
domestic factors) as well as military doctrines and strategies which have 
to determine weaponry procurement programmes. Otherwise, like many 
other analyses that tried to answer the questions raised above, an 
analysis would inevitably be short of  `bean counting`  with limited 
analytical insights for addressing the real questions in the Asia-Pacific 
region: military stability in general and crisis stability in particular.5 
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Security analysts agree that all North- and Southeast Asian states 
increased and modernised their military forces, primarily their air and 
naval forces, at a time when the United States and Russia reduced their 
military expenditures after the end of the Cold War. Given the fact that 
the Asia-Pacific region is largely a maritime area, its control depends 
heavily on air and naval superiority. Therefore, while taking into account 
the numerous unresolved territorial conflicts, a modernisation of air and 
naval forces is dictated by the future security demands of these 
countries.  
The broadening scope of regional security does not only encompass 
the traditional configuration of power such as military forces, the 
management of conflict, and the protection of Sea Lanes of 
Communication (Slocs). Since the beginning of the 1990s the reduction 
of the US presence, the need to monitor natural resources, to supervise 
labor migration and piracy, as well as to regulate environmental problems 
all contributed to major investments in East Asia’s air and naval forces. 
Furthermore, since the 1982 UN-Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Unlocs) came into force in 1994, military commanders in almost all East 
Asian countries used Unlocs to justify additional naval and air power to 
patrol the new offshore zones and to protect their newly claimed national 
sovereignty. 
In contrast to former times when in particular Southeast Asian states 
had preferred to purchase light air-fighters for anti-guerrilla warfare or to 
procure weaponry for prestige reasons rather than for real military 
missions, all East Asian states acquired advanced multi-role combat 
fighters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft in the 1990s. The numbers 
of aircraft deliveries and the quality of the most advanced types of those 
aircraft significantly increased, particularly during the four last years. 
During this decade, more than 3,000 new fighters and strike aircraft (such 
as the new dominant war-fighting weapons) were originally expected to 
be purchased by Asia-Pacific states including such advanced state-of-
the-art fighters as Russian made Mig-31s and -29s, SU-24s, SU-27s, SU-
30s, US-made F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18s, French-made Mirage 2000-5s or 
Japanese-made FS-Xs (or F-2). An equal number of existing aircraft 
were also expected to be modernised with new avionics systems and 
weaponry.6 Indeed, some 1,500 military aircraft and 6,800 SAMs, SSMs 
and anti-ship missiles had been delivered by overseas suppliers to the 
Asia-Pacific region and a broad range of related systems were added to 
these between 1990 and 1995.7 
Moreover, each year around 3,300 modern missiles for the new  
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aircraft, naval and land forces had been introduced into their arms 
arsenals. In the naval forces, some 200-250 new major surface vessels 
were originally planned for procurement by the new century. As the first 
country in East Asia, Thailand acquired from Spain at a cost of 360 
million US-$, a 11, 200-ton light aircraft carrier with a `ski jump` flight 
deck which carries up to 12 V/STOL AV-8 Matador aircraft and six S-70B 
Seahawk helicopters. Furthermore, international experts expected that 
more than 36 new modern submarines will be acquired by Asian states in 
the next decade - primarily by Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.8 Other Asian states had also considered buying new 
submarines but had shifted some of their current procurement plans into 
the next century before the financial and economic crisis hit the region in 
the summer of 1997.  
To sum up these acquisitions trends of new platforms and armaments 
before the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997:  
• The new weaponry acquisitions would allow many navies for the 
first time in East Asia to operate across the open ocean together 
with the US Navy. Therewith, the primary of their armed forces 
would shift gradually from the mission of counter-insurgency to 
external defence with conventional operations against high-tech 
regional opponents. While the residual potential for insurgency 
threats would not become obsolete, it would be downgraded to a 
secondary mission. 
• Moreover, all new major procurement programs of advanced 
modern weapon systems of the East-Asian armed forces also 
covered the acquisition of advanced electronic systems that 
included enhancements of technical intelligence capabilities, 
particularly of signals intelligence (SIGINT). The modernisation of 
command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I)-
infrastructure with microwave and fiber-optic channels to a country-
wide C4I-network - as it was already under way, for instance, in 
Singapore and Japan9 - could significantly improve both defensive 
and offensive capabilities of the Asian-Pacific armed forces.  
• Furthermore, the RMA has the potential to give even small armed 
forces (like Singapore’s) a hitherto unknown lethality and power 
projection capability (with an enhanced flexibility, range and 
precision engagement they never had before) well beyond its 
physical size of platforms and numbers. 
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On the other hand, however, it was already at that time necessary to 
state that purchases of sophisticated conventional weaponry did not 
translate automatically into competent and effective military 
organisations. With the exception of Singapore, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan, the acquisition of modern weaponry had been in many East 
Asian countries - albeit to a different extent - often disorganised, 
inefficient and uncoordinated. An US expert concluded in 1997 that their 
procurement policies are ´not an arms race to counter an external threat, 
but an arms rush to possess the newest weapons.´10 However, this 
conclusion was not very reassuring either for the future stability of the 
region. 
The procurement decisions also mirrored in the increasing military 
expenditures of East Asian states (see Table 1) though they have been 
not necessarily and always related to arms procurement programmes. 
The volatile Middle East was buying more weapons, but East Asia had 
the most rapid growth in military expenditure during the past decade. At 
the same time, it was to a great extent the result of its rapid economic 
growth. While global defence expenditures declined in the 1990s, the 
share of deliveries of major conventional weapons to Asian countries 
rose from 31 per cent to 49 per cent in the period 1988-97.11 The 
aggregate increase of military expenditures in the region during that 
 
Table 1:   Post-Cold War changes of North and Southeast Asian defence budgets  
        (1990-1996) 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 percent change  
1990-1996
 
USA. 293.0 283.5 274.8 287.2 251.4 252.4 252.6     - 13.8 
USSR 116.7 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Russia _ _   85.9   75.1   78.5   62.8   48.0     - 44.1 
Japan   28.7   32.7   35.9   39.7   42.1   53.8   45.1     +57.1 
PR China    6.1    6.1    6.7    7.3    6.7    7.5    8.4     +37.7 
Taiwan    8.7    9.3   10.3   10.5   11.3   13.1   13.6     +56.3 
South Korea  10.6    10.8   11.2   12.1   14.0   14.4   15.6     +47.1 
North Korea    5.3    2.4    2.1    2.2    2.3    2.2    2.9     - 54.7 
Vietnam   KA    1.9    1.8   KA    0.9    0.9    1.0       KA 
Indonesia    1.5    1.6    1.8    2.0    2.3    2.6    3.0     +100.0 
Australia    7.0    7.1    7.0    7.0    6.9    7.4    7.3      +4.3 
Source: IISS (Ed.): The Military Balance, 1990-96 eds., in: Kent E. Calder, ‘Asia's 
                               Deadly Triangle. How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to     
                               Destabilize Asia-Pacific’, (London 1997), p. 140. 
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period was more than one-quarter.12 According to a ACDA study of 1998, 
Asia accounted for 43.2 per cent of all arms transfer agreements signed 
with developing nations between 1989 and 1992 and 33.6 per cent of all 
such accords between 1993 and 1996.13  
Since 1985, nearly all Northeast Asian states (China, Japan, 
Taiwan, North- and South Korea) increased their defence budgets 
significantly and continually by more than one third, almost a quarter 
since 1992. In total, these five countries were responsible for more than 
70 per cent of all military expenditures in East Asia. During 1991-93, this 
subregion accounted for 85 per cent of aircraft imports and 89 per cent of 
missile imports in East Asia as a whole. China (which also ranked fourth 
among exporters of major conventional arms worldwide), South Korea 
and Taiwan belonged to the top ten countries in the world accounted for 
more than 50 per cent of the major conventional weaponry imports in 
1995. However, on the whole they had been able to increase their annual 
defence expenditures without raising the percentage of their gross 
domestic product (GDP) devoted to the military. 
 
In South-East Asia as well, military expenditures only increased at 
the same rate as the GDP (with the exception of Myanmar and 
Singapore). Between 1988-1996, military expenditures in the Asean 
countries increased by an aggregate of 52 per cent in real terms. But 
taken as a whole, Southeast Asian states were spending significantly less 
compared with their Northeast Asian neighbours. Nonetheless, the total 
annual defence budgets of 11 Southeast Asian countries was 1.3 times 
higher than seven Middle East countries and three times higher than the 
budgets of 10 countries Latin America between 1980 and 1996.14 
The IISS annual military survey of 1997/98 confirmed these trends 
by pointing out that the Middle East/North Africa remained the largest 
arms-importing region with 39.5 per cent of the total in 1996, whilst North- 
and Southeast Asia absorbed 23 per cent of the global arms market with 
purchases of 8.9 billion in constant 1995 US-$ (compared with 22 per 
cent or 8.5 billion $ for Nato and Western Europe).15 East Asia accounted 
for around one-fifth of the global arms trade and was, thereby, the 
second largest regional arms buyer. For the first time in the 20th century, 
it was offsetting the arms purchases of Nato-member states and other 
West European countries (see Table 2).  
On the other hand, it is important to note here that - according to 
IISS data - total weapon purchases by East Asian countries (in constant 
1995 US-$) were in 1995 (US-$8.5 billion) and 1996 (US-$8.9 billion) 
lower than in 1987 (US-$10.1 billion - see again Table 2). 
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Table 2: The global arms market 
Arms Delivered by 
Region (Purchases 
in Constant 1995 $  
  
Market 
  
Market 
  
Market 
  
Market 
  
Market 
   bn) 1987 Share 1994 share 1995 Share 1996 Share 1997 Share 
Middle East/  
North Africa 
31.9 37.5% 11,9 36.3% 14.4 39.0% 15.3 39.5% 15.6 33.7% 
East Asia 10.1 11.9%   7.0 21.4%   8.5 23.1%   8.9 23.0% 14.7 31.7% 
NATO/Western  
Europe 
15.1 17.8%   9.3 28.5%   8.6 23.4%   8.5 22.0% 9.3 20.2% 
Latin America   5.1  6.0%   0.8   2.4%   1.5   4.2%   1.6   4.1% 1.9 4.3% 
South Asia   6.3  7.4%   0.9   2.7%   1.3   3.6%   1.4   3.6% 1.7 3.6% 
Eastern Europe  6.9  8.1%   1.3   4.0%   0.8   2.3%   1.2   3.1% 0.8 1.8% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.5  7.7%   1.0   3.2%   0.3   0.8%   0.7   1.9% 0.9 2.1% 
Australasia  1.2  1.5%   0.4   1.3%   1.0   2.6%   0.7   1.9% 0.7 1.6% 
CIS/USSR 1.8  2.1%    0.1   0.3%   0.3   0.9%   0.3   0.8% 0.4 0.9% 
Source: IISS (Ed.): Military Balance 1997/98, Oxford-New York 1997, S. 265; ebda     
             
1998-99, Oxford-New York 1998, p. 272.  
According to SIPRI analyses, however, East Asia’s share of the global 
arms market was even bigger and, indeed, already became the largest 
arms market and largest arms market in the world: The share of global 
imports of major conventional weapons to Asian countries in total (which 
include - in contrast to the IISS data referring only to North- and 
Southeast Asia - also South-Asian, Australasia and Central Asian 
countries) rose from 28 per cent in 1992 to 48 per cent in 1996 
(according to IISS figures - see Table 2 -, North- and Southeast Asia, 
South Asia, Australasia and Central Asia have no more than 29 per cent 
in total).16 
All military expenditures in Asia, with some exceptions, thus mirrored a 
steady rather than an excessive trend in arms procurement. But 
sustained modern weaponry procurement was not the only reason for the 
increase of military expenditures. The expected lifecycle (or through-life) 
costs such as in-service life of modern combat platforms, their prime 
costs and through-life support also increased significantly at the same 
time both on the regional and global scales.  
Given the fact that most of the military expenditures were still in 
accordance with the increase of the GDP or even less (see above Table 
3), one could conclude that an ‘arms race’ was not taking place or that 
the ‘arms build-up’ in South- and Northeast Asia had been overstated 
before the outbreak of the Asian crisis. However, the data was and is 
often insufficient and many factors had often been overlooked17: 
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Table 3: East Asian defence spending as a percentage of GDP (1985, 1993-1998) 
 1985 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
PR China   7.9 5.3 5.3 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.3 
Indonesia   2.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Japan   1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
South Korea   5.1 3.6. 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.3 2.3 
Malaysia   5.6 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.2 3.4 3.2 
Myanmar    5.1 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 6.8 
Philippines   1.4 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.5 
Singapore   6.7 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.7 4.8 4.4 
Taiwan   7.0 5.4 4.7 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.5 
Thailand   5.0 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.2 1.5 
Vietnam 19.4 3.9 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.9 2.8 
Source: Tim Huxley/Susan Willet, ‘Arming East Asia’, Adelphi Paper No. 329 (IISS,  
               London), Oxford-New York 1999, here p. 17. 
 There are specific hidden costs from the civilian sector to the defence 
effort - related both to infrastructure (use of civilian airfields for military 
aircraft) as well as to platforms such as new roll-on-roll-off ferries (with 
military applications specifically in mind).  
(1) Comparable defence budgets according to clear common defined 
criteria (as they exist in NATO, for instance) do not exist until today 
despite some progress has been made by publishing defence `White 
Papers` for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) during the last years. 
The defence budget of China, for instance, is not yet comparable with 
others because it does not include military pensions, research and 
development (R&D), foreign arms acquisitions, and the costs of 
reserve and militia forces. The IISS, for example, has estimated the 
Chinese defence budget nearly three to five times the official figure 
because it does not report its military expenditures to the UN registry 
in the standardised format.18 It seems plausible that the technological 
modernisation of China's armed forces is - at least partly - masked by 
considerable non-defence funds. 
(2) Many difficulties in accurate assessments of the total international 
arms market: apart from a lack of transparency on the supplier’s and 
buyer’s sides, published figures mostly include only cash transactions. 
Other innovative ways in which many arms deals are nowadays 
increasingly being financed (such as by trading for debt forgiveness 
and by bartering for other products like consumer goods, food or oil) 
are often either underestimated or even overlooked.19 
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Furthermore, the political obstacles to overcome these difficulties of 
assessing the total defence expenditures and to limit the arms buildup 
are still considerable in East Asia: The establishment of viable, 
indigenous defence industries as part of their self-sufficiency policy to 
reduce their dependencies on suppliers abroad is a declared national 
policy goal. Any policies to reduce defence expenditures and subsidies 
for their emerging defence industries - even then when they acknowledge 
that their self-sufficiency policies and the subsequent creation of military 
industries are not cost effective20 - have been opposed not only by the 
military, but also by significant and influential parts of the political and 
industrial elite of these countries as the Asian crisis confirmed.  
Ultimately, however, it is always less the amount of defence budgets in 
relation to GNP/GDP which raises concerns for security and stability in 
the region. It is rather the nature, the quantitative and qualitative 
acquisition of weaponry, its specific programs to strengthen rather 
offensive military capabilities and the shifting geopolitical and 
geostrategic landscape in context of the arms procurement that demand 
further attention and more transparency. Military ‘hardware’ is only an 
indicator that has to be analysed in the wider context of its ‘software’ - 
military doctrines and strategies as well as structures of the armed forces 
- which only combined determine ‘warfighting capabilities and postures’. 
Hence, as I have already argued, acquisitions of weapon systems do not 
translate automatically to enhanced operational and warfighting 
capabilities. In this light, numbers do matter - but only to the extent of 
other important and often overlooked variables such as the software of 
military capabilities. 
Indeed, almost all North- and Southeast Asian armed forces began to 
undergo a fundamental change from internal to external defence as a 
priority of their defence policies and contingency planning. Those shifts 
from counter-insurgency capabilities to modern, high-technology 
conventional forces, with increased emphasis on maritime warfare had 
been seen as a natural process in the light of the maritime geography of 
East Asia, widespread perceptions of numerous uncertainties, unresolved 
territorial conflicts (often linked with disputed energy resources), and the 
arms buildup of their neighbours.  
The strategic value of the South China Sea for all neighbouring 
countries for instance, is a result of not only assumed rich resources like 
oil, gas, minerals and fisheries but equally from the free movement of the 
major international shipping lanes in the South China Sea because  
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most of the foreign trade is by sea. The signing of the UNCLOS in 1982 
and the spectacular economic growth and regional trade have reinforced 
the strategic importance of the archipelagic sea-lanes of communication 
(Slocs) in East Asia such as the Malacca Strait, the alternative Sunda 
and Lombok passageways as well as the sea-lanes around the Spratly 
islands. They have been recognized as being among the most critical 
choke-points. These Slocs were and are of vital security concern to 
virtually all states in South- and Northeast Asia.  
Even countries like Thailand and South Korea with their traditional 
priority for ground forces began to shift their procurement policies to 
maritime missions. Though South Korea's threat perception was still 
primarily directed towards its northern brother and its military capabilities 
of ballistic missiles, equipped with possible ABC-warheads, at the same 
time it was looking forward toward an increasing naval power that 
commensurates with its increasing national economic strength and its 
dependencies on the regional and global markets. Similar to Japan, 
about 99 per cent of South Korea's trade is done by water. In the view of 
South Korea's security experts, the protection of Slocs could no longer be 
exclusively the task of the US Navy on which South Korea was 
dependent hitherto. Given the space of time of 10-15 years for major 
procurement planning, defence experts pushed a strong South Korean 
naval power - including to obtain at least a 15,000-ton light aircraft carrier 
and new destroyers, frigates and submarines - to serve as a ‘balance of 
power’ between China and Japan (the latter was and is often seen in 
South Korea as ‘the next greatest military threat’ in the 21st century 
which reflects Seoul’s still existing mistrust of its neighbour).21  
As military planners increasingly recognised in Asia-Pacific, the shifts 
to external defence planning and the inclusion of new technologies based 
on the RMA also require new military doctrines and structures of East 
Asia’s armed forces. Given the uncertainties of future conflicts - high-
intensity, medium-intensity and low-intensity conflicts -, military doctrines 
of flexible responses have to be developed and implemented for multiple 
missions across an extensive spectrum of contingencies such as 
deterrence, coercion, warfighting, policing, peacekeeping, peace-
enforcement, humanitarian aid and assistance to the civil authority. All 
these new doctrines need to be based on integrated, joint, combined, and 
coalition warfare to produce cumulative, synergistic effects on air-land 
and sea-space military operations. These future military organisations 
would be characterised by high mobility, flexibility, adaptability, and 
decentralisation. In this light, the RMA demanded reforms not only in the  
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military or military-industrial sector, but in education and other areas as 
well. But most of the Asian-Pacific armed forces had only limited 
experiences with integrated, combined and multilateral military missions 
and joint warfare concepts of their different services until the beginning of 
the Asian crisis. In many ways, they were insufficiently prepared for the 
new challenges - not only technologically, but also politically to cope with 
transnational security challenges and international peacekeeping as well 
as peacemaking operations.  
Given the need for complex high-technology weapon systems and 
intensive training requirements to master the full spectrum of these 
capabilities, conscript armies are becoming more and more a structure of 
the past. In the next decade, massive armies with outdated capabilities 
will be replaced by small high-tech forces that are able to exploit new 
technologies and highly trained as well as motivated skills of their 
soldiers. 
Even before the looming financial and economic turmoil, it was unclear 
whether the armed forces in the region would really be able to exploit the 
full spectrum of the newly acquired military capabilities. It depended not 
so much on the military hardware but rather on the software of military 
organisations: adequate structures of the armed forces and according 
military doctrines, strategies, operational plans and realistic as well as 
adequate contingency planning. It was and is the area where most of 
East Asia’s military elite is facing the greatest difficulties in changing their 
military organisations. The significant weaknesses in combined or joint 
force operations and integrated logistical support as well as the still 
existing predomination of separate single-service cultures were identified 
as the main barriers in changing the military organisations according to 
the needs of the RMA in the region.22 
However, the structures of the armed forces were in almost all Asian 
states under consideration. Others had already changed to more mobile 
and mechanised forces such as amphibious units or ‘Combined Arms 
Divisions’ with mixing infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, air defence and 
engineer elements.23 A fundamental restructuring capabilities to modern, 
high-technology conventional forces, with increased emphasis on 
maritime warfare, seemed to be in the process of implementation. 
Indonesia had already formed a Rapid Reaction Strike Force in 1984; 
Malaysia was introducing a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) of divisional 
strength (about 12,000 troops), Singapore and Thailand also announced 
plans to create a RDF division.24  
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The creation of such RDFs would determine new weaponry 
procurement such as the purchase of large numbers of new helicopters 
in the forthcoming decade to transport those new mobile units to the hot 
spots whilst others are needed for fire support.  
In general, those transformations of Asia’s armed forces would 
considerably extend their force-projection capabilities for securing their 
EEZs and Slocs. In times of serious crisis and growing instability, 
however, they could also destabilise and undermine crisis stability by 
creating pressures for pre-emptive or even preventive military options. 
Moreover, arms acquisitions always occur in a concrete internal or 
external political environment. They could even unintendendly determine 
future threat perceptions of both friends and adversaries.25 Given a 
rapidly deteriorating situation on the Korean peninsula, in the Taiwan 
Strait or the South China Sea, the most important as well as most 
disturbing trends of weaponry acquisitions until 1997-98 can be 
summarised as following: 
• Restructuring counter-insurgency capabilities of Northeast and 
Southeast armed forces to modern, high-technology conventional 
forces, with increased emphasis on maritime warfare. Even in 
countries like South Korea26 or Thailand with traditional priority for 
land forces, the modernisation of air and naval forces had been 
given preeminence. The defence planning and the threat 
perceptions were shifting increasingly from internal to external 
defence missions; 
• Proliferation of offensive capabilities such as (maritime) attack 
aircraft, submarines equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles; 
• Ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with low observable 
technologies and considerable accuracy and penetration against 
existing and non-existing anti-missile shields. In littoral warfare 
conditions, the reaction time from launch to detection would be 
limited to seconds at the beginning of the new century; 
• Widespread interest in modern electronic systems for C4I and 
electronic warfare, surveillance, intelligence and target acquisition 
equipment; and 
• Increasing military capabilities in key areas of combat systems, 
electronic countermeasures, over-the-horizon targeting and 
surveillance. 
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Impacts of the Asian Crisis on the military modernisation: an 
end of the regional arms buildup? - images and realities27 
 
Even before the outbreak of the financial crisis in the summer of 1997, 
economic problems began to affect regional arms spending. As the result 
of the financial and economic malaise starting in July 1997, most 
Southeast Asian countries (with the notable exception of Singapore and 
Brunei) and South Korea in Northeast Asia have seen their currencies 
substantially drop in value against the US$ by 32-70 percent until the end 
of 1998 (see also Table 4). The crisis had an unpleasant impact on 
national budgets, with the defence sector most strongly affected by cost-
cutting measures.  
The depreciation of national currencies left many governments unable 
to meet existing financial commitments or to push through new and 
ambitious long-term purchase plans or near-term procurement funding for 
new weaponry. The proclaimed cuts in the defence budgets hurt military 
modernisation plans and hindered operational activities. Cuts in military 
training, exercises and procurement had affected and ultimately 
undermined operational readiness of the armed forces for peace- and 
conflict times. Moreover, rising levels of inflation and unemployment 
produced more immediate consequences for national security. The most 
direct victim of the economic crisis was Indonesia which also witnessed 
the sudden collapse of the 32-year Suharto regime.  
Table 4: East Asian Economies, 1996-1999 
GDP Growth Change in Currency Value 
against US$ 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 June 1997-May 1999 
China 9.6%   8.8%     7.8%   8.2% no change 
Indonesia 8.0%   4.9% -13,7% -3.9% -69% 
Japan 3.8% -0.7% -2.1% -0.7% -8.0% 
South Korea 7.1%   5.5% -5.5%   3.7% -26% 
Malaysia 8.6%   7.8% -7.0%   2.0% -34% 
Philippines 5.8%   5.2% -0.5%   2.3% -30% 
Singapore 6.9%   8.0%   1.5%   2.0% -17% 
Taiwan 5.7%   6.8%   4.8%   4.5% -15% 
Thailand 5.6% -1.3% -7.0% -0.5% -30% 
Source: Tim Huxley/Susan Willet, ‘Arming East Asia’, Adelphi Paper No. 329 (IISS,   
               London), Oxford-New York 1999, here p. 17. 
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Finally, the crisis has also affected the fate of political leaderships in 
Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and Japan. Understandably, the 
immediate tasks for several Asian countries has been seen in the 
restoration of political stability and the creation of a conducive climate for 
economic recovery and growth. 
Regional military expenditures were basically affected in two ways: (1) 
by depreciation of the currencies, which made imports roughly twice as 
expensive as before; and (2) by reductions in central government 
expenditure which resulted in rising costs of living and cuts of social 
expenditures for the population. 
All countries affected by the crisis had been forced to reassess their 
ability to pay for recent arms purchases. On the surface, the depreciation 
seemed to make further arms purchases impossible in the near future. 
The financial crisis had in particular a notable impact on submarine 
construction and other major purchases in the region: Thailand (looking 
for two- or three submarines) and Indonesia (previously planned to 
expand its two-boat flotilla) suspended indefinitely their long-planned 
submarine procurement programmes and postponed them into the next 
century; Malaysia’s plans too, became less likely in the foreseeable 
future; South Korea, relying on a $55 billion rescue package from the 
IMF, was not able to pursue its programmes as scheduled with larger, 
bluewater-capable boats with air-independent propulsion (AIP). It was 
expected that it would be postponed at least by several years.28  
However, a closer analysis reveals a very differen picture when 
comparing the extent to which the various countries had been affected by 
the financial crisis: The crisis had not hit the region uniformly. In this 
regard, it is important to note that some East Asian states such as 
Taiwan, China, Singapore and Brunei were either not affected, or only 
marginally affected by the crisis. Singapore announced that the currency 
crisis would not slow down its modernisation programme. It reassured 
defence manufactures that this region would remain one of the most 
lucrative markets in the world. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, by contrast, had either slowed down the pace of their 
modernisation programmes or in some cases even suspended major 
arms purchases (i.e. Thailand, Indonesia). Thus far, the crisis had the 
greatest impact (in regard to cuts of arms acquisitions) on South Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand (see Table 5 below).  
Despite some very deep cuts in the defence budgets of South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia and more moderate ones in Malaysia and the 
Philippines (whose modernisation programme was halted for economic  
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Table 5: Major Programme Casualties and Effects of East Asia’s Financial  
              Crisis at a Glance  (until the early summer of 1998) 
 
  
Cont´d ... 
Country Cancellation and Delays Defence Budgets 
Cuts/Remarks 
South Korea • Delay of 220 weapon projects  
including purchases of (1) four US-
made early warning aircraft through 
2003; (2) construction of three 
1.500-ton submarines and (3) three 
advanced destroyers as well as (4) 
of   C-17 airlift transporters; 
•  Scale down of production of short-   
    range missiles (‘Chonma’), MLRS   
    and other arms projects; 
   •  Delay of local development and    
    production of 94 advanced KTX-2 
jet trainers; 
•  Other austerity measures likely to     
   affect South Korea’s armed forces    
   such as slowing down oversea  
   training, cuts in fuel and ammunition,  
   scale down of training exercises and  
   cutting back on barracks maint- 
   tenance; 
• Defence budget cuts in purcha- 
  sing power are about 1.35 billion  
   won (around 9% of the total  
   budget of 14.03 trillion won or   
   $9 billion); 
• The real budget has been cut by  
    almost 30 per cent; 
Philippines • Scale-back of original procurement  
   plans to acquire 12-24 multi-role  
   fighters and additional maritime  
   patrol aircraft along with air-defence  
   radar as well as of a dozen patrol  
   boats; however, the government  
   selected in April 1998 14 internatio- 
   nal defence groups to submit offers  
   for a contract to purchase three off 
   shore patrol vessels and 13 multi- 
   role combat aircraft; 
• $2 billion had been allocated for  
   the five years of a $13 billion, 15  
   year modernisation program; 
Malaysia • Modernisation programme will be  
   slowed and delayed;  
• Plans to spend $500 million. for new  
   weapon procurement (including to  
   create a submarine force and  
  
• Cuts in 1998 defence spending of  
   $83 million (10% of the defence  
   allocation); an additional cut of  
   8% is being studied (given the  
   decline in exchange rate, the  
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  8 CSH-2 Rooivalk attack helicopters); 
• Cuts in major civil engineering and  
   defence structure programmes; 
  Defence budget might be reduced  
  de facto by 21 per cent); 
Indonesia • Cancellation of 12 Russian-made  
   SU-30K fighters and 8 Mi-17V  
   Helicopters (”postponed indefinite- 
   ly”); 
• Cancellation of 5 German second- 
   hand submarines (”postponed indefi 
   nitely”); 
• The real defence budget has  
   been slashed by 40 per cent or  
   more; 
• Major cuts in arms purchases; 
• Cuts in the number of military  
   attachés posted abroad; curtail- 
   ing of expenditures for training  
   and exercises; 
Thailand • Cancellation of eight US-made 
F/A-18    C/D fighters; delayed by 
three years to  
      2003; 
• Additional delay of payments on 
$550 million worth of other arms 
purchases announced; 
• The purchase of a US$1-biillion 
Star of Siam satellite to monitor 
Thailand’s borders; 
• The navy’s plans for two 
conventional submarines; 
• Flight training and joint exercises 
cut by 70 per cent; 
• F/A-18C/Ds were ordered in 1996  
   for $392 million (no further  
   breach-of-contract penalty costs  
   for the cancellation of F/A- 
   18C/Ds); 
• Defence budget for 1998 reduced  
   from $1.04 billion to $800 million  
   (35 per cent of the origional  
   budget in real terms);    
Source: F.Umbach, ‘Financial Crisis Slows But Fails to Halt East Asian  
             Arms Race - Part One’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR), August          
            1998, pp. 23-27, here p. 26. 
 
and political reasons already prior to the outbreak of the economic crisis), 
whereas Singapore, Brunei (Taiwan and China, by contrast, had further 
increased their defence budgets) had been only marginally affected by 
the financial and economic crisis in East Asia. Most of the regional 
procurement plans had been slowed down, delayed and postponed rather 
than completely and definitely suspended. The reasons that the 
modernisation processes and the arms build-up in East Asia had not 
been halted - which had been confirmed by Sipri’s and other analyses29-  
have been because of the need to find in long-term security policies, 
industrial considerations and macroeconomic policies on both sides - 
arms suppliers and arms recipients: 
 
 
 
Military Balance in the Asia-Pacific 349 
(1) China’s Military Modernisation: Despite - or because - of the financial 
crisis in East Asia, the pace of China’s military reforms and 
modernisation efforts was and is still casting a shadow over the 
equipment plans of other countries. Perceptions of an emerging 
Chinese blue-water navy in East Asia that will stretch China’s maritime 
interests beyond the East and South China Sea, the ongoing 
development of two all-new fighters - the J-12 long-range multi-role 
fighter (F-15-like; enter service by in 2015) and the J-10 (F-16-like with 
technological support of Israel; enter service until about 2005) and 
other major procurement plans - a major streamlining of its aerospace 
industry and restructuring of its armed forces under way towards 
future information-warfare and a chain-of-command modelled along 
US lines (based on a military strategy of ‘active defence’) as well as 
the building of its first satellite ground station with military implications 
outside China on Kiribati’s main atoll Tarawa have contributed to a 
looming China threat that might come true for its neighbours much 
earlier than assumed before the outbreak of the crisis30, albeit for the 
time being it is more a matter of perception than reality. Whereas 
other East Asian states are cutting their defence budgets, China’s 
defence budget in 1998 and 1999 enjoyed a 10th year of double-digit 
growth, compounded by significant cuts in troop strength that were 
announced in 1997. The defence budget has increased again by 12.9 
per cent to US$10.99 billion in 1998-99. However, China might be 
confronted with its own socio-economic crisis in the near future that 
could force Beijing to slow down its military spending and to scale 
back its ambitious modernisation efforts significantly and earlier than it 
is currently assumed by China’s military elite. 
(2) Long-term Security and Military Interests of the United States: The 
countries hardest hit by the crisis are among the most vital allies of the 
United States. In this regard - and for the first time-, the Clinton 
administration cancelled a foreign military sales contract with Thailand 
at its own expense. Symptomatically for Washington, long-term 
security concerns and policies are why it had been training Indonesian 
military forces since 1992 under a little-known US$10 million DoD 
programmme called Combined Exchange and Training (that includes 
training for psychological warfare and urban combat techniques) 
despite a congressional ban intended to curb human rights abuses as 
it was revealed in March 1998. During a trip to Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Thailand, China, Japan, and South Korea in 1998, US  
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Defence Secretary William Cohen discussed the implications of the 
crisis and the need for these countries to balance their military and 
economic interests. He expressed concerns, for instance, about 
South’s intention to cut the defence budget, fearing that the Congress 
would be less willing to support Korea if Seoul cut its defence budget.  
In the view of the US defence ministry, the purchase of US defence 
systems such as the Patriot  surface-to-air-missile system was seen 
as vital to maintaining regional interoperability between US armed 
forces and those of its allies in the region. Therefore, it is interested to 
work with customer countries in Asia in order to adjust payment and 
delivery schedules to keep current programs solvent and to provide for 
sustainment, maintenance and military-to-military relationships 
required for coalition warfare. The US, for example, helped the Thai 
military with a training and exercise programme under a broad 
economic aid package with an overall value of $1.7 billion announced 
in Washington in March 1998. In return, the US received ‘unrestricted 
movement’ in Thailand’s regional waters.  
However, resentment of latent anti-Americanism  in East Asia - the 
consequence of the widespread perception in Asia-Pacific that the US 
is using the crisis as leverage to force countries to open up previously 
closed markets - also complicated the efforts of the United States to 
accomplish its long-term security policies and short-term adjustment 
strategies to bolster the defence capabilities of its major allies in the 
region. In the US as well as in East Asia, the crisis had been perceived 
as a ‘litmus test’ for Washington’s bilateral relations with its allies in 
the region. As a preventive strategy, although most of these 
discussions started long before the outbreak of the Asian financial and 
economic crisis, the US consolidated its bilateral defence ties with 
Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia during the last 
three years. 
(3) Other Vital US Interests in the region: However, the US crisis 
management was not only related to long-term security concerns. It 
was also driven by industrial interests and wider political reasons. 
Thus the cancellation of purchases of US weaponry could increase the 
US trade deficit that would make it more difficult for the Clinton 
administration to persuade Congress to give the President more 
leeway in concluding free-trade agreements with Asian countries. 
Furthermore, the crisis undermined Pentagon efforts to get its Asian  
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allies to pay more for their own defence. Asian purchases of US 
weaponry had increased from 10 per cent a decade ago to about 25 
per cent in 1997. These arms deliveries to East Asia and elsewhere 
lowered per-unit prices or aircraft and other major weapon systems for 
the US´ own purchases, with production costs rising due to the smaller 
numbers of total weapon systems sold abroad. In this light, the US 
armed forces also had a financial interest in helping to salvage 
weapon purchases quite apart from its wider security and military 
interests in the region. That explains why the US DoD was interested 
in helping and supporting these countries by either stretching out 
deliveries or finding alternative methods of payment. The US had to 
take care of its standing in the region, ensuring that its East Asian 
allies perceive it as a reliable, flexible supplier, particularly in times of 
crisis.  
(4)The Interests of Suppliers and Buyers: Declining global defence 
expenditures, large overcapacities and a shrinking global arms market 
at the end of the Cold War created a ‘buyer’s market’ in the 1990s that 
has given recipient countries new opportunities and flexibility to shop 
around for the best arms deals (often including transfers of technology 
and know-how) and playing one supplier off against another. 
Consequently, the supply side of the equation has resorted to all kinds 
of marketing and discounting devices, including, if necessary, 
extensive technology transfer arrangements (often part of offset 
agreements), as well as barters and even bribes. At the same time, 
during a global defence industry reconfiguration, many East Asian 
countries have gradually shifted their procurement policies from the 
initial import of large numbers of completed weapon systems to the 
local assembly and production of major weaponry through licences, 
joint venture agreements and technology transfers. Hence, Asian 
customers are no longer interested just in the final products, but rather 
more interested in comprehensive packages, involving collaboration 
with local industry, technology transfer, creative financial 
arrangements and creation of jobs in their countries. This explains why 
customers are more and more interested in long-term partnerships 
(‘lifetime marriages’) with suppliers that provide solutions to larger 
overall national requirements, possibly extending beyond defence it- 
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itself. The slowing of East Asia’s military spending and arms build-up 
has increased further the competition between American, European 
and Russian arms makers and suppliers in sustaining sales in the only 
growing arms market in the world besides the Middle East. This 
increasing competition could result in further ‘dumping’ prices of 
sophisticated state-of-the-art weapon systems and an even further 
technology transfers to the region (as Russia’s modified arms export 
policy to the Asia-Pacific region has indicated).31 
To sum up, the overall impacts of the Asian crisis and regional defence 
recession on Southeast Asia’s specific modernisation and procurement 
efforts, seems to be - despite multiple cutbacks - relatively small, partly 
because of the absence of major orders (such as Taiwan’s purchase of 
150 F-16s in the early 1990s). In Northeast Asia, South Korea’s major 
cuts in the procurement budget has delayed and slowed down but not 
definitely stopped the modernisation programmes.  
Most of the US and European civilian aircraft manufactures believed 
that Asian markets promise long-term potential (because of business and 
tourist travel expansion) even though the regional crisis had led some 
companies to cancel or delay some orders. A protracted crisis, however, 
would force countries like Indonesia to rethink the basic scale of their 
development; state-of-the-art weapon systems will continue to be in 
demand but will be less affordable. Western defence contractors also 
saw the financial and economic crisis only as temporary phenomenon, 
whereas nations’ defence and security are long-term issues. The East 
Asian nations were consequently adopting a ‘wait and see’-attitude to 
determine the depth and breadth of the recession. Furthermore, France 
was eager to lift the EU weapons embargo on China in an effort to sell its 
advanced military technology. But even with the embargo, Europe’s main 
arms suppliers gradually stepped up their military contacts with China 
(the sale of certain technologies and specific equipment, such as radar 
surveillance systems,- was allowed). 
Thus, the data already available in 1998 indicated that limited 
procurement of new weaponry will continue in most countries, but on a 
more prioritised basis according to their funding availability and their 
specific threat perceptions. 
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New trends of modernisation and increased defence 
spending  
 
Meanwhile, the defence market in East Asia seems already stabilised 
after the economic downturns in 1997 and 1998. Although the Asian 
economic crisis has thinned out the regional aerospace industries, as 
some companies shut down their production capacity, while others are 
beginning to merge or close shop altogether, a devaluation of the 
regional currencies and heightened competition have made Asia a much 
cheaper and therefore more interesting place for future manufacturing. 
Hence the crisis might eventually lead to the surprising effect of East 
Asia’s aerospace industries expanding their role as a parts and services 
supplier to the West’s large aircraft industries.32 
Moreover, some of the strategic trends to reduce the defence budgets 
and scale down procurement programmes have already been reversed in 
1999:  
• South Korea: While Seoul announced in the spring of 1998 to 
postpone or to spread 220 weapon programmes, it has proclaimed in 
February 1999 to initiate major weapon purchases within a total of 
$69.3 billion on defence spending between 2000 and 2004. These 
procurement programmes will include three KDX indigenous 
destroyers, 60 F-X fighters, new attack helicopters and UAV. Only its 
former plans to acquire AEW aircraft are still deferred until 2004.33 In 
May 1999, the government confirmed to build 20 additional F-16C/D 
combat aircraft for an estimated 800 billion won ($663) to supplement 
120 F-16s built under license by Samsung Aerospace Industries. The 
procurement decision, however, has primarily been made due to 
economic reasons (to ease the strain on South Korea’s troubled 
economy, i.e. to bolster the local aerospace industry) rather than for 
any concrete short-term defence needs. Consequently, the 
programme funding for the additional aircraft will not affect the 
defence budget.34  
• Thailand: The Royal Thai Air Force, unable to resume the purchase of 
new F/A-18 combat aircraft from the US, meanwhile, has bought 25 
second-hand Alpha-Jets from Germany (originally it wanted 50 planes 
to buy) in 1999 and is now in the process of acquiring 16 US-used F-
16A/Bs (which will be modernised to F-16Ds, eventually even been 
armed with AMRAAM-missiles) from the US Air Force.35  
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• Malaysia has signed a contract for the design, construction and 
delivery of the first six of a planned fleet of 27 New-Generation Patrol 
Vessels (NGPVs)36 and has begun contract negotiations for up to six 
UK-built Super Lynx naval helicopters, estimated RM700 million (US-
$158). It also expects to take delivery of the two 2,270-ton Yarrow-
class frigates from Britain at the end of this year. Both frigates are 
armed with Exocet ship-to ship-missiles. Furthermore, it has now 
reactivated ist former plans to build up a submarine fleet. It has 
already begun plans for a series of Shallow Underwater Attack 
Submarines armed with two torpedo tubes and capable of carrying 
small underwater demolition teams. These new submarines will also 
be equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems which will allow 
much longer underwater operations. Reportedly, Russia is interested 
to sell its 636-Kilo-class submarines to Malaysia.  
• Singapore has confirmed it will buy eight AH-64D Apache Longbow 
attack helicopters (the first country to do so in Southeast Asia), with 
deliveries expected to begin from about 2002.37  
• The Philippines: Its military expects to finalize the contract to acquire a 
new combat aircraft at the end of the year, after selecting six 
companies to bid for the new fighter aircraft to replace its ten Northrop 
Grumman F-5A/B/Es. In the meantime, it will boost its F-5A inventory 
by procuring additional five F-5s from South Korea.38 Given the 
devaluation of its currency, the Philippine government has slowed 
down its ambitious 15-year modernmisation programme (1995-2010) 
by concentrating on upgrading its weaponry and command, control, 
communication and intelligence systems (C3I).39 But military 
modernisation programme remains a subject of ongoing dispute due 
to a lack of funds and complex bureaucratic procedures. President 
Estrada has relaunched the programme with an initial investment of 
only six billion pesos (US$ 157.9 million). Nonetheless, Manila is 
considering acquiring Perry-class and Knox-class frigates in the 
framework of transfers on a grant basis. The frigates in question would 
be the largest ships ever deployed by the Philippines navy.40   
• Vietnam: is considering acquiring additional 24 SU-24/-27 air 
superiority/ground attack combat aircraft from Russia in order to 
supplement 12 already acquired.41  
• China: China’s defence budget of 2000 has increased again by 12.7 
percent in the 12th consecutive year of double-digit growth whereas its 
economic growth rate went down to just 7 pecent in 1999. Last year,  
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the defence budget rose officially by 15 percent. However, as a 
consequence of the Kosovo conflict and the unfortunate bombing of 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrad, China seems to have increased its 
defence budget. In May 1999, the State Council reportedly diverted 
Rmb 20 billion from large infrastructure projects to the defence 
budget. Until 2003, a total of Rmb100 billion will be allotted. Another 
Rmb 80 billion had been mobilized to enhance the fighting ability of 
China’s armed forces, including high-tech conventional weapons and 
strategic as well as tactical nuclear weapons and second-strike 
capabilities. With these additons to the official defence budget of 
1999, the actual total one reached Rmb 215,2 billion at the end of that 
year – almost double the size of the original budget (Rmb 115,2 billion) 
according to Hong Kong.42  
Against this background, China is presently in negotiations with 
Russia to buy another 40 SU-30MKK fighters to supplement its order 
for 40-60 SU-30MKK aircraft last August. It will also receive around 
100 AA-12 ‘Adder’ medium-range air-to-air missiles, which are 
equivalent with the most modern US-made AIM-120 ‘AMRAAM’ 
missile.43 It also seeks to acquire two or three upgraded ‘Kilo’-class 
submarines and two or three more Sovremenniy-class destroyers.44 
Furthermore, Russia seems to have sold the ”Kiev” heavy aircraft 
carrier.45 However, $1 billion is needed to put the carrier to sea and 
many years to train a crew. But this development will certainly catch 
the attention of both regional and global players. In addition, China 
seems close to deploying an anti-aircraft defence system that uses 
technology it can track even Stealth-type warplanes.46 China is also 
building two more Jiangwei II-class guided missile frigates.47 In last 
January, it launched a military communication sattelite that is a major 
component of the first integrated C4I system.48 A planned Russian sale 
of two Typhoon-class nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles, 
however, has been denied.49 Furthermore, China made faster 
progress in the development of nuclear-armed long-range cruise 
missiles than previously expected by Western experts.50 The PLA has 
given the development of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) high 
priority in particular for medium to long range strike missions. 
Reportedly, some 100 joint Chinese-Russian research and 
development projects are under way and more than 2.000 Russian 
technical experts are assumed to be working in China in order to 
upgrade and modernise China's nuclear armed forces. Moreover, a  
 
 
 
 
The Asia Pacific in the New Millennium 356 
Russian article of August 1997 reported that both sides have agreed 
even to work out an automatic command and control system (C2) for 
China’s strategic nuclear forces.51 But such a system is not 
necessarily inexpedient for a nuclear power with less than 300 
strategic nuclear warheads. Is this another indicator for China’s 
ambitions not only to modernise its nuclear forces but also to increase 
its numbers of missiles and warheads? 
 
 
Implications for the military balance in East Asia 
 
To analyse the present military balance in East Asia - in particular for the 
Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea - it is 
necessary to take into account the wider political conditions and 
prerequisites of the specific ‘hotspots’ in East Asia. Before I analyse 
these ‘hotspots’, I will review China’s often neglected ambitious nuclear 
modernisation which will sooner or later deeply influence not only the 
security perceptions of the regional states and external powers but also 
changing the global balance of power. 
 
Regional and global military balance - The impact of 
China’s nuclear modernisation efforts52 
China’s ambitious programmes of modernisation of its nuclear forces, 
including of its IRBMs ‘to provide strategic dominance over East Asia’ 
(Richard Fisher53), seem to be another proof of the future shifts of the 
military balance in the region because they seem mainly proactively 
doctrine-driven (a departure from the PLA’s past rather reactive practice). 
They demand further changes in the PLA’s force structure, strategy and 
concepts of operation. Given Western estimations of China’s current 
fissile material stock, after acquiring the MIRV54 technology China can 
expand ist nuclear forces two or three times its present size (from 300 to 
600-900 warheads).55  
Despite facing tremendous problems such as insufficient funds in 
modernising ist armed forces - although even the official military budget 
has increased by approximately 33-40 per cent in real terms over the 
past five years - and the low level of its military technology base, 
numerous development programmes of its nuclear forces are under way. 
In contrast to the United States and Russia, the modernisation and  
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expansion of China’s nuclear and conventional armed forces have not 
been directly constrained by any international arms control regimes such 
as START or the INF-treaty. At the same time, uncertainty about these 
Chinese modernisation programmes and Beijing’s long-term strategic 
intentions behind those military programs under way arise primarily from 
the lack of transparency in its military sphere. 
The focus on improving the qualitative level of China’s nuclear forces 
with the help of recruited former Soviet weapon scientists and engineers 
is directed toward a miniaturising of warheads, better targeting accuracy, 
penetration and anti-electronic interference capability, modernising its C2-
networks, developing a MIRV capability as well as increasing the 
survivability and the camouflage of its nuclear forces such as storing 
them underground and deploying on mobile, land-based launchers or 
submarines.56 The PLA navy is currently working on a new advanced 
nuclear submarine that will carry 12 SLBMs and will be deployed in the 
next decade. As part of the programme, this new type of a nuclear 
submarine will be equipped with a new SLBM, called Jiulong-2 (CCS-NX-
4), with a range of 8,000 km. It will allow Chinese submarines for the first 
time to target parts of the US from areas located near the Chinese 
coast.57  
Western experts anticipate that China will deploy 4-6 submarines, 
each armed with 12 SLBMS. That would add alone 48-72 warheads to 
China’s nuclear arsenal, with even more, if China can succeed with its 
MIRV development (expanding the number of warheads on the SLBMs at 
least two or three times).58 A new mobile, solid-fuel ICBM, named 
Dongfeng-31 (DF-31), was tested by China at the end of May 1995, few 
days after the indefinite extension of the NPT, and in August 1999. It also 
has a range of 8,000 km and can carry a payload of 200-300 Kt. The new 
ICBM is expected to be operable until the end of this year59 Another solid-
fuel mobile ICBM (DF-41) under development will have a range of 12,000 
km and is anticipated to become operational before 2005-2010.60  
Furthermore, China is also developing ground- and air-launched, land-
attack cruise missiles, partly from versions of its turbojet powered C-802 
anti-ship missile. Reportedly, this cruise missile with a range of at least 
120 km, carrying a payload of 165 kg, will incorporate a highly accurate 
Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance system and a terrain contour-
matching radar to improve the accuracy required to perform precision-
strikes against high-value civilian and military targets such as command 
and control centres or government buildings in Taipei.61 This and other 
future cruise missiles (which have been developed much faster than anti- 
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cipated)62 with their low altitudes will present a major detection challenge 
for future Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) radar and for effective counter 
measures. A report to the US Congress already warned in 1997: ‘A 
missile fleet of this size could overwhelm any theatre missile defence 
capability planned for this vital region and fundamentally alter regional 
calculations of the balance of power.’63 
However, China presently still lacks an adequate limited nuclear war-
fighting posture with a satellite based early-warning (EW) capability and 
sufficient counterforce as well as countervalue tactical, theatre and 
strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional or nuclear 
war. But it is also clear that China is going to close this ‘window of 
opportunity’ - the gap between its operational requirements of the limited 
deterrence strategy and its nuclear doctrine assumptions - for its 
perceived potential adversaries. This is because China’s strategists have 
concluded that Beijing’s deterrent is uncertain or even frail and thus not 
credible enough. It leads to a greater Chinese interest in launch-on-
warning or launch-under-early attack postures and hence pre-emptive 
nuclear strategies64 that ultimately will undermine crisis stability.  
In the view of China, an effective TMD-option of the United States and 
its allies Japan, South Korea and Taiwan against China’s nuclear ballistic 
missiles would not only question its nuclear deterrence against those 
potential aggressors but also dramatically increase the US ability to 
launch a disarming first strike against China. Consequently, China is - like 
Russia - essentially interested in the endorsement of the principles 
behind the ABM-treaty.65 Although Beijing’s objections against TMD-
systems in its three neighbouring countries are to some extent 
understandable, most of China’s argumentations are not very convincing 
and persuasive if they are analysed more in detail.66  
While the assumption that China will be able to close the gap between 
the nuclear doctrine and its operational requirements as well as 
capabilities over the next decade remains uncertain, China’s nuclear 
strength will nonetheless increase as the consequence of the 
international de-nuclearisation of the nuclear superpowers United States 
and Russia. By implementing START-II, both arsenals will be downsized 
to 3-3,500 warheads. Consequently, the combined nuclear arsenal of 
both superpowers to Chinese strategic nuclear forces would fall from 70:1 
to 7:1, or 3.5:1 compared with one of the nuclear superpowers (see also 
the Table 6).67 Forthcoming START-III negotiations between the US and 
Russian side will further reduce their arsenals to expected 2,000-2,500  
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Table 6:  China’s present nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the four original   
                nuclear weapon states 
Strategic Nuclear Weapons of the Original ‘Nuclear Five’ (1999) 
Country Suspected 
strategic nuclear 
weapons 
Suspected non-
strategic nuclear 
weapons 
Suspected total 
nuclear weapons 
China   284   150     434 
France   482       0     482 
Russia 7,200 6,000-13,000 13,200-20,000 
UK    100   100     200 
USA 8,500 7,000 15,500 
Source: Ehsan Ahrari, ’China Eyes NATO’s Nuclear Doctrine’, in: Jane’s  
              Intelligence Review (JIR), April 1999, p. 38 f., here p. 39. 
 
nuclear warheads on each side or even lower (in the case of Russia) by 
the end of 2007. A potential Chinese nuclear arsenal of some 600-900 
warheads in the future would then automatically not only raise China’s 
global political prestige but also the scope of its regional nuclear and 
conventional military options in the Asia-Pacific region (including towards 
the United States).  
Moreover, one has to take into account that China has, in contrast to 
the United, no security commitments requiring a credible extended 
deterrence posture that justifies high numbers of warheads. However, it 
might help to explain another trend of China’s discussions of military 
doctrine - the increasing linkage between the PLA’s conventional and 
nuclear options.68 With a secure northern border towards Russia, China’s 
military strategy has now shifted its attention from the more general 
peripheral defence of the country to concrete maritime defence in order 
to guarantee militarily its officially claimed economic zones and territorial 
sovereignty in the South China Sea and increased military options toward 
Taiwan.69 Against this background, China’s increasing nuclear retaliatory 
capability might primarily function to prevent great power interference in 
local and limited conventional wars under high-tech conditions with small 
and medium powers such as those in the South China Sea. A credible 
nuclear deterrence option that guarantees nuclear escalation and its 
control similar to Nato’s flexible response strategy of the 1980s requires 
thus both the qualitative modernisation and quantitative increase of 
China’s nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. 
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Although the most dramatic improvements of China’s armed forces 
are indeed taking place in its strategic and theatre nuclear force 
modernisation, its future capabilities might be constrained at least to 
some extent by China’s adherence to the CTBT, a fissile material cut-off, 
the possibility to deploy Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) or Theatre 
Missile Defence (TMD) systems in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
possible START-IV negotiations between all five nuclear powers.70 
Critical technological limitations such as computer capabilities for 
satellite-linked C3I or increasing the number, accuracy and survivability of 
delivery means might also constrain an unlimited modernisation program 
of its nuclear forces. However, as analysis of China’s military exercises 
and missile tests71 as well as revelations of exporting 46 powerful US 
supercomputers to the Chinese Academy of Sciences72 (which could be 
used for the testing of nuclear warheads) have shown during the last 
years, those technical constraints might not be the major barrier against 
the modernisation programs for China’s nuclear armed forces. Relaxed 
US export control for sensitive dual-use technologies could indeed help 
China to build stealthier and longer range cruise and ballistic missiles with 
a much greater accuracy73 as the controversial Cox-Report has 
indicated.74 
 
The Korean Peninsula 
Although Pyongyang continues to observe the October 1994 Agreed 
Framework and a moratorium on missile launches as it negotiates with 
the US, South Korea and Japan, it has also continued its missile 
development short of test launches (indeed, it has only suspended testing 
of long-range ballistic missiles). Moreover, it has been selling missiles as 
well as missile technology to customers around the globe. In the absence 
of comprehensive inspection procedures, other countries cannot be 
confident that North Korea has stopped working on the development of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Its missiles are capable of 
striking Japan and the US and inflicting even greater damage on South 
Korea. Their development has security implications for South Asia and 
even for Europe.75 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile blackmail strategies, including 
refusing to allow international inspectors full access to its nuclear sites,76 
the launch of a Taepo-Dong-I on 31 August 1998,77 and revelations of a 
vast underground facility under construction which US intelligence 
sources identified as the site of a reactor or reprocessing plant78 led to  
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calls for a comprehensive re-evaluation of US policies towards North 
Korea.79 Pyongyang‘s policies of blackmail, by undermining the October 
1994 Agreed Framework, have called into question the entire Kedo-
process for the freezing of the DPRK‘s plutonium programme. 
Given that North Korea views its missile capability as its last trump 
card when trying to entice Washington into negotiations over the 
withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, future prospects of the 
Agreed Framework at first glance appear to be rather poor. Furthermore, 
the DPRK is believed to have produced sufficient plutonium to construct 
2-6 bombs.80 With continued submarine and special forces incursions into 
the South, ongoing tunnelling under the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), and 
preparations for new missile tests under way since late 1998,81 the 
present situation on the Korean peninsula seems just as tense as it was 
before the signing of the Agreed Framework.  
Against this background, a growing number of US experts and 
politicians called for a fundamental diplomatic review in a broader context 
of arms control measures to be applied to the Korean peninsula.82 Even 
those experts who still favoured continuing with, rather than abandoning 
the Agreed Framework, argued in favour of a ‘new deal’ incorporating 
‘new issues of concern by supplementing it (the Agreed Framework) with 
new and  more comprehensive commitments’ because it could otherwise 
be impossible to save it.83 What is indeed lacking in US policies towards 
North Korea is a comprehensive, long-term strategy that creates a 
common framework for Agreed Framework/KEDO issues, US-DPRK 
missile talks, and related initiatives.84  
While North Korea’s missile exports and transfers of missile 
technology so far have not had direct security implications for Japan, its 
missile test of August 1998 fundamentally changed Japan’s short-term 
security perceptions and defence policies with implications for the US-
Japan alliance and the relationship between Japan and China. 
Although the May 1999 Kumchang-ri85 inspection by fifteen US experts 
under the direction of former secretary of defence Dr. William Perry did 
not produce evidence for the previous or intended production of 
weapons-grade plutonium or reprocessing activities,86 the site could 
support such facilities in the future if substantially modified. Moreover, a 
considerable part of North Korea’s earlier nuclear programme and many 
nuclear facilities have remained unmonitored since the signing of the 
Agreed Framework in October 1994. Therefore, until follow-up visits to 
Kumchang-ri, scheduled  for May 2000, any definite conclusions cannot 
be reached. 
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Following the June 1999 naval clash between South and North Korean 
vessels in the Yellow Sea, during which South Korea sunk at least one 
North Korean ship87, observers expected the launch of another long-
range Taepo-Dong 2 ballistic missile to serve as a ‘force multiplier’ on 
September 9, 1999 marking the 51st anniversary of the Communist 
government. From Pyongyang’s point of view, the test would have 
demonstrated the DPRK’s determination and capability to offset South 
Korea’s increasing lead in conventional military technologies. 
Furthermore, North Korea was building an underground missile base – 
from which Taepo-Dong-1 and –2s could be fired – in the mountainous 
area of Youngjeo-dong, just 20 kms from its border with China, a site that 
had probably been chosen to avoid pre-emptive strikes by US cruise 
missiles.88 In sum, North Korea seems unwilling and unable to bargain 
away its only remaining trump card, namely, its ballistic missiles. 
Ultimately, missile development cannot be divorced from the goal of 
sustaining the DPRK’s political system and regime. Therefore, US and 
Western comprehensive engagement strategies can hardly succeed – 
whether they assume the guise of the 1994 Agreed Framework or that of 
any other attempt at conditioning.  
North Korea’s armed forces are facing tremendous difficulties as the 
result of the socio-economic crisis. But its military capabilities seems still 
formidable and have also been strengthened during the last years. 
According to South Korean sources, Pyongyang has also increased its 
stockpiles of food and oil for its armed forces and has introduced new 
weapons systems in its ground, air and navy forces.89 Moreover, South 
Korea has currently no adequate defence capabilities to counter North 
Korea’s missile threat. It possesses only six Patriot missile batteries 
which are deployed only in the south to defend rear-area US bases. 
Through the current economic and financial crisis has slowed down the 
modernisation of its armed forces it will not have an impact on the military 
balance on the Korean Peninsula given the economic problems of North 
Korea and the continued presence of the US armed forces on the South 
Korean soil. Moreover, to enhance its operational capability to ABC-
warfare, North Korea has created chemical warfare platoons at the 
regiment level. With its eight factories to produce chemical weapons and 
other facilities for producing biological weapons90, North Korea is able to 
conduct simultaneous chemical and biological attacks on both the front 
and rear of South Korea with various delivery systems such as artillery, 
multirocket launchers and Scud-missiles as well as aircraft.91  
Nonetheless, during the 1990s, the overall balance of power on the  
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peninsula has decisively shifted in South Korea’s favour with North 
Korea’s economy hovering on the brink of collapse. With the weakening 
of North Korea’s former relative strength, Pyongyang’s, its sense of 
insecurity has been getting stronger. Under such circumstances, it has 
sought to develop nuclear and missile capabilities to guarantee its military 
and political survival. It may try to speed up its missile development to 
enhance its deterrent capability – particularly after having experienced 
Nato´s intervention in Kosovo. At the same time, a political collapse of the 
Pyongyang regime is not imminent. 
It remains to be seen whether Pyongyang’s new diplomatic activism92 
will have lasting positive implications for security in North East Asia. 
Pyongyang’s main interest is in foreign aid and investment, but the 
above-mentioned activities could also reflect a steady increase in self-
confidence within the North Korean regime as the country’s protracted 
famine shows signs of some easing.93 Even more important for the future 
- as the talks on rice aid and the flood relief have shown, since 1995 - the 
North Korean leadership fears nothing more than the opening up of its 
society to the international community94, one of the most important 
prerequisites for all ‘soft-landing’ strategies and more far-reaching 
confidence-building measures. 
Against this wider background, speculating about a possible US 
pullout following reunifications would not only be premature but would 
send the wrong signal at the wrong time. However, Seoul is in a difficult 
position. On the one hand, South Korea must rely on American forces to 
deter potential North Korean attacks. On the other hand, these forces‘ 
very presence could increase the likelihood of conflict, and, 
simultaneously, undermine or at least compromise the successes of 
‘sunshine diplomacy’ – a strategy of constructive engagement and 
gradual peaceful reunification with North Korea through the promotion of 
peace, reconciliation, and cooperation. Therefore, incremental South 
Korean shifts away from dependence on the US remains possible, 
particularly with China pressuring Washington by playing the ‘North 
Korean Card’. A complete US troop withdrawal, however, would not only 
have important security implications for the Korean peninsula, but for 
Northeast Asia as a whole. As a consequence, discussions such as the 
one recently stimulated by the South Korean Defence Ministry with a view 
to justifying higher defence budgets are in many respects 
counterproductive and short-sighted (in this context, unified Germany can 
be viewed as a positive example for a troop reduction short of a complete 
US withdrawal). 
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Taiwan - China: 
 
The conflict in the Taiwan Strait seems presently to have replaced the 
Korean Peninsula as the most dangerous flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific. In 
the light of the continual modernisation efforts and procurement 
acquisitions of state-of-the art weaponry from Russia, the military balance 
in East Asia might step by step change at the expense of Taiwan in the 
next decade. Recently-increased tension between China and Taiwan in 
the run-up to Taiwan’s 18 March 2000 presidential elections have once 
again emphasized one of the region’s major security risks.95 In contrast to 
its response to the 1996 presidential elections, however, Beijing chose to 
use words to impress Taiwanese candidates and voters, rather than 
missile tests and large-scale manoeuvres in the waters surrounding the 
island republic.  
China’s ‘White Paper’ on Taiwan, issued on February 21, 2000,96 and 
meant to intimidate Taiwanese voters, was confusing for foreign 
observers but could be interpreted as a compromise between hard-line 
and soft-line factions. On the one hand, the paper sent a clear message: 
China would attack Taiwan if the island declared independence, or if  it 
was occupied by a foreign power or China would establish a new linkage, 
if Taiwan indefinitely refused to enter into negotiations on reunification. 
On the other hand, however, Beijing appeared to agree to one of Taipei’s 
main conditions for political talks with China, namely, that the island be 
treated as an equal and not as a ‘local government’. The White Paper 
mentions this principle of equality no less than five times. Overall, 
however, the policy paper would appear to signal an increasing PRC 
impatience. Indeed, President Jiang Zemin has repeatedly said that he 
intends to make reunification of the motherland his own legacy. From 
such a perspective, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have to be 
brought about by the time the 17th Communist Party Congress convenes 
in 2007, when Jiang Zemin will be 81 and retire from the political scene.97 
At the same time, the PLA – that has already acquired unprecedented 
capacity for influencing the policy-making process98 and that could be the 
biggest winner from increased tension with Taipei99 – has been asked to 
‘actively prepare’ for war with Taiwan. In an internal document sent by 
CPC‘s Central Military Commission to all regional commanders, Beijing 
warns of an ‘increased possibility for a military solution’, should nonviolent 
means fail to accelerate the absorption of Taiwan. The document 
envisions a blitzkrieg-like offensive opened with a first fatal strike so that 
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that ‘the Taiwan forces have no way to organize effective resistance.’ 
From Beijing and the PLA’s points of view, any backlashes on this issue, 
similar to the proclamation in July 1999 by Taiwan’s (former) President 
Lee Teng-hui’s of a ‘two-countries theory’ would fuel mainland China’s 
disintegration by encouraging independence for Tibet, Xinjiang and other 
occupied areas. The White Paper also mentions that it is very unlikely 
that European countries would come to Taiwan’s rescue, but anticipates 
a US intervention to defend the island against an attack. Interestingly, the 
document is completely in line with the PLA’s interest in ‘asymmetric 
strategies’ of warfare to be used vis-à-vis the US. The PLA believes, for 
example, that such a conflict will not escalate into a nuclear missile 
exchange, because the US will lose its will to fight and withdraw after 
suffering serious casualties, while the Chinese side will be able to absorb 
heavy casualties and prevail.100 Therefore, China does not require a 
military equilibrium with the US. 
‘Leaner but meaner’ - a term used in the 1980s to describe the RMA 
underway in the Warsaw Pact armies as the result of the (Marshall) 
Ogarkov-reforms - has determined the defence policies and structures of 
East Asian armies during the last decade. China as the world's largest 
standing army has also announced further cuts of its armed forces 
(500.000 before 2000 after those of the 1980s and 200.000 in the last 
two years101) to 2.5 million in 1997. Already since 1985, China's military 
doctrine has shifted from an early, large-scale and all-encompassing 
‘people’s war’, based on an attrition military strategy, to local and limited 
wars around China's periphery. These doctrine shifts have also led to an 
evolving concept of limited nuclear war deterrence102, resting on a limited 
nuclear war-fighting capability and denying the adversary victory in a 
nuclear war.103 As a consequence of these new doctrines as well as 
military strategies, rapid reaction forces and other special units have 
been formed.104 Nonetheless, although the PLA will also be in the future 
the largest armed force in the world, additional financial resources for 
future high-tech warfare (i.e. electronic and information warfare) and what 
Chinese defence experts called ‘joint warfighting’ - an umbrella phrase 
under which a multitude of changes in PLA's structures, organization and 
military doctrine are taking place - have to be mobilised to meet the 
security demands of tomorrow. 105 
While Beijing remained remarkably silent immediately after the 
Taiwanese elections, a PLA source threatened Taiwan with a two-million-
soldier invasion force on 200,000 fishing boats, while adding that nuclear  
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weapons were a viable option, particularly so if the US interfered.106 The 
PRC‘s supposed interest to return to a more moderate policy can be 
explained by the fact that its failure to threaten Taiwan into submission 
may have undermined the CPC’s domestic legitimacy. Furthermore, 
China has benefited considerably from business links with Taiwan.  
If present strategic trends continue, however, the military balance in 
the Taiwan Strait will erode over the next decade.107 In recent years, the 
PLA has revised its strategy for a Taiwan contingency.108 It now hopes to 
achieve its objectives without fighting a war, by wreaking economic havoc 
and instigating social unrest in Taiwan. Hence, ‘weapons’ that target the 
Taiwanese media, the stockmarket, and the islanders’ psyche, have 
become an important part of China’s military thinking on Taiwan. 
However, and depending on the island’s own policies and actions, 
gradual escalation strategies might still involve missile tests, a sea 
blockade, combined-force drills, and a military buildup. Such strategies of 
attrition, based on a ‘war of nerves’ and designed to undermine the 
morale of the Taiwan population, could provide the PLA with the best 
chances to succeed in a major conflict while at the same time preventing 
a US intervention.109  
Moreover, the 1995/96 missile tests had been quite successful. They 
escaped Taiwan’s early warning and detection radars110 and were much 
more accurate than American experts had previously expected.111 They 
underscored both the progress the PLA had made in modernizing its 
missile force and specific military shortcomings on the Taiwanese side; 
Taiwan was unable to detect the missiles and thus could not have 
destroyed them. The US remains the lone regional player with sufficient 
signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability to detect PRC missiles in `real 
time`. Taiwan – like Japan and others – is heavily dependent on the US in 
crucial areas such as real-time information about Chinese troops and 
missile forces. Without the US information back in 1995/96, Taiwan 
would neither have known precisely when they were launched and when 
as well as where they hit their target zones. With the new US-made E-2T 
reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, Taiwan had for the first time 
direct information exchanges with the US E-8 `Joint Stars` 
reconnaissance aircraft in a war-like operation. Furthermore, the July 
1995 and March 1996 missile tests were conducted in conjunction with 
broad multi-service exercises, in which, in the future, tactical ballistic 
missiles are going to play an increasingly important role.112 It was one of 
the major lessons of the crisis ‘that the PLA can challenge Taiwan’s vital 
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interests without direct engagement.’113 Unsurprisingly, the PLA has also 
drawn its more painful lessons and will try to fare better next time.  
While the PLA currently lacks a credible invasion force and will 
continue to do so until at least 2005, China has been rapidly increasing 
its short-range ballistic missile force in numbers as well as in quality.114 At 
the moment, the PRC is deploying an advanced, longer-range version of 
the DF-21, provisionally called DF-21X, with an extended range of 3,000 
kms and an improved accuracy.115 Moreover, Beijing plans to launch six 
satellites before the end of the year which will improve the accuracy of its 
ballistic missiles and will allow detailed reconnaissance of Taiwan’s 
defence capabilities. At the same time, the PLA has made considerable 
progress in developing manoeuvrable short-range ballistic missiles with 
ranges between 300 and 600 kms and has been developing a new 
generation of land attack cruise missiles to accurately target key 
Taiwanese military installations with the help of newly acquired dual-use 
technologies such as the GPS and the Inertial Navigation Guidance 
System (INS).116 These dual-use technologies are widely available on the 
civilian market. In 1999, China deployed 150-200 M-11 (range 300 kms) 
and M-9 (range 600 kms) short-range ballistic missiles in addition to 30-
50 SRBMs deployed in 1995-96 in provinces adjacent to the 175-km-wide 
Taiwan Strait – most of them presumably with improved accuracy, 
estimated to be 20-30 metres by using GPS and INS minicomputers 
which are widely available on the civilian market. Beijing reportedly plans 
to further increase that number to 650-800 missiles by the year 2005.117 
This rearmament is at least partially due to the fact that the PLA – in 
contrast with China’s Foreign Ministry and other civilian ministries – 
continues to view the controversial missile tests of 1995 and 1996 as a 
political victory.118 In a few years’ time, the Chinese missile build-up could 
shift the balance of deterrence in favour of mainland China and prompt 
Beijing to adopt more risky policies vis-à-vis Taiwan. 
The creation of Taiwanese Rapid Reaction Forces (RDFs) will 
result in new weaponry procurement such as the purchase of large 
numbers of new helicopters to transport those new mobile units to the hot 
spots whilst others are needed for fire support. Taiwan, for instance, has 
recently detailed plans to acquire around 100 new transport helicopters to 
equip two air-mobile brigades with a strength of about 6,000 for defence 
in the Taiwan Strait.119 These plans are part of a revision of Taiwan’s 
contingency planning. While Taiwan’s General Staff formerly assumed a 
full-scale amphibious assault from China, it now considers a series of  
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Limited attacks, a partial blockade (particularly by submarines), the 
seizure of offshore islands and the launch of ballistic missiles against the 
island of Taiwan (as ‘test firings’ of M-9s missiles, featuring enhanced 
accuracy, into the seas near Taiwan during military exercises have shown 
in 1995 and 1996) as the most likely military threats of the PLA. These 
revisions of Taiwan’s contingency planning are the result of its impressive 
modernisation programs (particularly of its air and naval forces) and the 
numerous, still existing, shortcomings of the PLA’s capability to start a 
full-scale invasion in the near future.120 
Taiwan’s impressive military modernisation programmes of the 1990s 
notwithstanding, one may ask whether the island‘s armed forces will be 
able to effectively use latest additions to their weaponry, given a lack of 
force multipliers and adequate military training, low morale, and 
operational as well as doctrinal shortcomings in both strategy and tactics. 
Furthermore, the last time that Taiwan’s armed forces conducted joint 
military exercises together with the US was 20 years ago. The extent of 
intra-operability – technical, doctrinal, as well as operational – and 
experiences made with joint military operations therefore remains rather 
limited. 
In response to the missile threat, Taipei will deploy three Patriot 
batteries in northern Taiwan to protect the capital city and economic 
centre. However, these are no watertight shield against every incoming 
missile.121 Taiwan is therefore no longer interested in ballistic missile 
defence alone, but intends to develop and deploy its own offensive 
ballistic missiles (such as the Tien-Ma with a range of 1,000 kms).122 
Taipei’s current modernisation and procurement efforts can be explained 
by the wish to buy time for the democratisation on mainland China rather 
than maintaining a military balance.  
While reunification with Taiwan remains Beijing’s number one 
political priority, any unprovoked missile attack or invasion of Taiwan 
would likely produce regional and global instabilities by provoking (1) 
increased US military supplies to Taiwan or a US military intervention, (2) 
Taiwan’s rejection of reunification and declaration of independence, (3) 
Japan’s rearming and tightening of the US-Japan alliance, and (4) 
China’s own economic and political isolation from the global economy 
and Western sources of investment. 
The present situation will not and cannot last forever. Beijing 
needs to at least meet Taipei and the new political realities halfway in an 
attempt to define a new, more stable formula for both its relations with 
Taiwan and Washington.  
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Although Taiwan appears ready to enter into negotiations for 
reunification, it is simply not interested in the kind of outcome that Beijing 
is seeking. Therefore, negotiations will only transfer both sides’ mutually 
exclusive interests to a higher political level without resolving them. Given 
Beijing’s self-declared time-pressure to finalise those negotiations by 
2007, inherent pressures and conflicts can probably only increase. The 
next three to five years are thus predicted by most US experts to become 
a period of heightened tensions and potential crisis. Whether, as has 
been argued, there is a new Beijing ‘timetable without time limit’123, 
remains to be seen.  
 
 
The South China Sea and Southeast Asia 
 
These ARF and CSCAP processes since 1993/94 have helped ASEAN to 
assume the leading role in defining its goals, scope, and processes. 
Ultimately, however, they remain dependent on the political cohesion and 
unity of Asean as well as on the stability of the strategic triangle (China, 
Japan, and USA) in the Asia-Pacific region. Given Asean’s ambivalent 
relations with China and Japan and the unclear triangular relationship 
among these major three powers in Asia-Pacific, the future process of 
multilateralisation and institutionalisation in Asia-Pacific remains 
uncertain, particularly in regard to the efficiency and effectivity of 
preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and management. Although 
these processes will move forward and become even more important, the 
ARF’s and CSCAP’s main purpose for the time being seems to lie still in 
the field of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs as the 
OSCE/CSCE is doing it in Europe) and broader security discussions 
rather than becoming a multilateral or even a supranational institution for 
conflict resolution and management that is rather a long-term task. 
Hence, realistically speaking, the ARF cannot replace firm security 
arrangements involving specific bilateral or multilateral defence 
commitments (such as Nato’s in Europe) in the foreseeable future. Those 
specific defence arrangements in Asia-Pacific are tailored in traditional 
bilateral defence and security treaties particularly with the United States.  
In the mid-term, the security architecture of the Asian-Pacific region 
will comprise traditional and new bilateral relationships with new 
intervowen multilateral security arrangements such as the ARF and 
CSCAP rather than replace the bilateral security ties with the United  
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States. At the same time, by trading cheap arms in exchange for political 
support within the ARF on sensitive issues such as territorial conflicts, the 
US military presence and the Taiwan question, Beijing has driven wedges 
into the political cohesiveness of Asean. Simultaneously, China’s 
strategic policies serve the expansion of its political influence in South- 
and Southeast Asia. 
The underlying problems and security challenges in Southeast Asia 
have become even more complicated when one considers the current 
intra-ASEAN military cooperation. Despite Asean’s creation of a regional 
common sense on security in recent years, those tendencies have not 
been automatically transferred to a significant greater intra-ASEAN 
defence cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral defence ties between the 
member states have certainly been increased, cumulating  in numerous 
bilateral and multilateral military exercises to a mutual benefit. However, 
Asean’s defence cooperation has remained limited to the level of coping 
with low intensity threats such as piracy and smuggling. Exchanges of 
military intelligence, for instance, function only at the level of counter-
insurgency operations. Defence links in Asean still lie more in the realms 
of confidence-building than in functional co-operation towards practical 
objectives such as joint defence planning, joint initiatives in arms 
purchasing and production, developing compatibility between different 
military doctrines and armed forces. An important exception is the 
cooperation regarding joint peacekeeping efforts, initiated only recently 
and have been driven by the present East Timor and other peacekeeping 
operations rather than by any strategic design of Asean. Moreover, these 
efforts are just at the very beginning and reveal once again how difficult it 
still is to deepen the military dimension of intra-Asean co-operation. 
Characteristically, it is less Asean itself than the FPDA which opens 
channels for communication regarding defence issues. The Intra-Asean 
defence relationships are therefore still characterised by a strange 
mixture of cooperation, competition and latent conflict that provides a 
striking picture of Asean’s self-declared image of an established and 
successful regional security order. Thus in particular, the defence 
planning of Singapore and Malaysia is at least partly based on the 
mistrust between each other, stimulating their arms acquisition policies 
and new threat perceptions toward each other. In this light, two analyses 
have concluded: 
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‘The absence of multilateral defence co-operation between Asean’s 
members, and the widespread lack of substance (other than in the 
sense of confidence-building) in bilateral defence co-operation 
indicate the most widely underestimated influence on defence 
policies in the region.’124 
‘Asean might never be a Nato but there is no reason why it should 
not present a more robust and united front to those who tend to 
ignore the association or take advantage of the Asean way. The 
combined forces of Asean are in total impressive in quantity and 
quality. But they are, it must be admitted, lacking in cohesion, 
definition of objectives, and even general co-operation. Major 
benefits would accrue if these limitations were to be addressed.’ 125 
 
The deepening of intra-Asean defence cooperation is also important 
because Asean’s defence postures have begun to shift from an emphasis 
on counter-insurgency to conventional defence against external attacks. 
By combining their defence efforts, Asean would be able militarily to deter 
potential aggressors. As the Australian defence expert Brian Cloughley 
noted at the end of 1997: 
 
‘If there is not a vigorous response by the Asean members as a 
defence grouping they could find themselves not only isolated, 
militarily, concerning the Spratlys (as they appear to be at the 
moment, diplomatically witness the ARF meeting) but bereft of 
significant economic resources to which they otherwise might have 
been able to lay claim. The Asean way works well when gentlemen 
are involved, as they have been for so long. It might not be a 
solution when the seas are full of sharks.’ 126 
 
Moreover, without raising transparency, intensifying Confidence and 
Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and deepening defence co-
operation within Asean, misperceptions in crisis could potentially increase 
and lead to pre-emptive or preventive military actions during crisis and 
conflicts. The current financial and economic crisis might have reduced or 
postponed concerns about those acquisition trends and their security 
implications. But unfortunately, the decline of regional defence 
expenditure has not only affected future procurement programmes, 
operations, and training but also defence cooperation between Asean 
member states. Normally, one could argue that defence cuts would result 
in enhanced rather than decreased defence cooperation by sharing the 
common costs of training and education. Furthermore, as a result of 
cancelling joint training and exercise activities as well as decreasing the 
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attendance of military officers at Staff Colleges in other countries 
disproportionally from the cuts in defence expenditures, the process of 
enhancing CSBM and raising military transparancy in the region has been 
severely damaged. In this field, too, multilateralism had lost momentum 
by 1997. If Asean wishes to avoid future intra-Asean security dilemmas 
and at the same time to increase its efficiency in defending its national 
and regional security interests, Asean member states must not only be 
willing to seriously discuss greater ASEAN security co-ordination, but also 
greater defence cooperation. 
In the meantime, the PRC‘s policy of underpinning its territorial claims 
with concrete political and military steps as well as Beijing’s unwillingness 
not to rule out the use of force for achieving political objectives have 
alarmed even those segments of Asean’s political elites that have always 
favoured close relations with China.  
Nonetheless, China‘s sovereignty claim has ultimately fastened the 
reconfiguration, in both conceptual and operational terms, of the defence 
policies of Asean countries.127 But the Indonesian crisis and the East 
Timor problem have halted all efforts to redefine Indonesia’s strategic 
interests vis-á-vis China and the South China Sea. Once again, domestic 
stability understandably has become for Indonesia and probably also the 
Philippines again the major preoccupation and will continue to dominate 
the national agenda over the next few years. 
China may still believe it is able to achieve its objectives over time 
without resorting to massive confrontation with neighbouring claimant 
states. Beijing’s present rather contradictory policies and actions in the 
South China Sea follow a traditional ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, and 
are fully in line with its strategic culture and notions of war and 
diplomacy.128  
Whereas all claimants to territories in the South China Sea have 
stated their preference for peaceful solutions and negotiations, China 
appears to have kept the military option open. Arguments put forward by 
Western experts that occupied islands can not be defended by the PLA 
presently129 overlook the fact that China is a growing nuclear power and 
that Asean countries as well as Japan, Taiwan, and others lack sufficient 
amphibious forces to recuperate occupied islands. Only the US has 
sufficient and effective amphibious capacities to perform such a task in 
the South China Sea. But making use of the military option would 
constitute a high risk game for Washington, too. Reliance on aircraft 
carriers and Aegis-equipped surface escort ships, for instance, would be 
inadequate if not dangerous in littoral conflicts in the Taiwan Strait or the 
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South China Sea.130 Ultimately, what matters in this respect are security 
perceptions and expectations rather than objective strengths and 
weaknesses of claimant countries. Military history, including that of 
China, has abundant examples of weaker forces defeating much stronger 
rivals. Circumstances, motivation, and a superior strategy have often 
been more important than numbers. 
Whether the US would want to incur such a risk for a few uninhabited 
islands in the South China Sea is indeed the crucial question for Asean 
security experts. Prior to the outbreak of East Asia’s financial crisis in 
1997, Asean defence policies and military doctrines were increasingly 
based on such a scenario which in turn determined acquisitions of state-
of-the-art weapons systems.  
Although China had verbally agreed not to change the status quo in 
the South China Sea through unilateral steps and to seek a peaceful 
solution through negotiations, the PRC has continued to test the political 
will of Vietnam and the Philippines as well as their support within Asean. 
Moreover, despite signs of solidarity emerging within Asean when China 
tested its political will in 1995 and 1997, Beijing‘s efforts to pursue its 
strategy ‘at limiting alliances forming against it have been remarkably 
successful, particularly during the period they needed this success most: 
in establishing a physical presence in the Spratlys and gaining some 
recognition of the legitimacy of China’s sovereignty.’131 And indeed, China 
has rather successfully frustrated the attempts to internationalise the 
dispute, insisting on exclusively bilateral negotiations which provide the 
PRC with considerable strategic leeway vis-à-vis its much weaker 
opponents. 
China’s more recent policies in the South China Sea have confirmed 
the assumption that the PRC follows a dual track strategy of, on the one 
hand, ‘creeping occupation’ to create faits accomplis in the South China 
Sea and, on the other, diplomatic appeasement vis-à-vis Asean. 
Unable to confront China militarily and to make any difference except 
by continuing to talk with the Chinese side and trying to get international 
public opinion behind it, President Estrada pushed the January 1998 VFA 
with the US through ratification. The agreement provides for joint large-
scale exercises between US and Philippine forces on Philippine soil and 
in the region.132 Although China subsequently promised not to build any 
new structures in the Spratly islands, more ‘renovation work’ (as the 
Chinese side called it) cannot be ruled out in the light of previous 
experiences. Although China has repeatedly offered ‘joint development, 
including fisheries development and exploitation on an equal sharing  
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basis’133 realisation of such proposals remains dependent upon the 
readiness of the Philippine side to accept China’s territorial sovereignty 
over the Spratly Islands.  Decreasing Asean solidarity even more than 
China’s provocative behaviour have significant long-term security 
implications for the Association and regional stability. Kow-towing to 
China’s increasing assertiveness risks encouraging even more 
dangerous behaviour. 
In this regard, China’s ongoing provocative behaviour and future 
Philippine or Vietnamese counter- and overreactions constitute an 
‘accident waiting to happen’ that might trigger an otherwise unintended 
escalation. This trend is further reinforced by increases in competing 
commercial and military activities and the easy availability of new military 
hardware, as well as China‘s lack of recognition of the risks resulting from 
a unilateral ‘creeping occupation’ that changes the status quo in the 
region.  
Since summer 1999, the Philippines and other Asean states have tried 
to manage territorial conflicts in the South China by drafting an Asean 
code of conduct as a CBM and by exercising ‘self-restraint and refrain 
from unilateral actions’ that might increase tensions. Manila had hoped 
that the code would deter China from building more structures in other 
parts of the disputed island chain. Even more important was the 
expectation that the code of conduct would restore Asean unity in dealing 
with sovereignty and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, thus 
strengthing ASEAN’s collective leverage to constrain China’s ‘creeping 
assertiveness’ in the area. 
Once adopted, such a code could help to build trust, enhance 
cooperation, and reduce tension in the Spratlys. However, it would be 
naive and unrealistic to believe that it would really resolve territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. In the past, China has already signed 
bilateral codes of conduct with the Philippines (August 1995) and 
Vietnam (November 1995), without abiding by the very principles spelled 
out in these agreements. Neither the abovementioned codes nor Beijing’s 
signing of the UN Charter of the Law of the Sea (Unclos) in April 1996 
have deterred the PRC from extending the structures it had previously 
built on disputed islands in the South China Sea. Furthermore, 
agreements such as the newly-proposed regional code of conduct are 
declarations of intent rather than legally binding instruments. As long as 
Asean shies away from collectively confronting China as had been the 
case in 1995 and 1997, Beijing will hardly feel prompted to halt its 
‘creeping assertiveness’ in the South China Sea.134  
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Against this background, the US attempt to stay neutral for as long as 
the freedom of navigation is guaranteed and Slocs remain open and to 
otherwise adhere to an excessively legalistic interpretation has provided 
China with opportunities to skillfully advance its ‘creeping assertiveness’ 
by playing on legal ambiguities reinforced by US policies. In the 
meantime, certain experts and policy circles in Washington have become 
more concerned about the present situation.135 Obviously, future US 
policies towards the South China Sea remain critical for stability in the 
entire Southeast Asian region. 
 
 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
 
The present economic and financial upturn after the Asian crisis has 
allowed the resumption of the previously announced, but then halted 
modernisation efforts, particular of the air- and naval forces in East Asia. 
The increasing capabilities offered by the proliferation of anti-ship 
missiles and submarines creates new military threats and could deepen 
the security dilemmas in the region such as fuelling the arms build-up to a 
real regional-wide arms race. Even for the US carrier battle groups, the 
increasing numbers of submarines and small, fast-attack missile craft 
raises the risk level of its regional operations. Regional waters might 
become even more dangerous, when larger class submarines and 
destroyers as well as frigates become more common. Moreover, a 
destabilised Indonesia, confronted with breakaway fractions or rebel 
forces could acquire vessels with anti-ship and other missiles which 
would cause serious security problems in Southeast Asia. 
Asean states need not only to rebuild political solidarity but also to 
increase defence co-operation in order to overcome their traditional 
strategies of self-reliance which have often deepened the classic security 
dilemmas. The recent first multilateral meeting of senior intelligence 
officials of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand can be seen as a first step in this direction. The intelligence 
exchange will be held annually which will also help to build trust and 
confidence between all involved parties and to prepare their armed forces 
for future multilateral peacekeeping operations. Another positive step can 
be seen in the inclusion of Singapore in the traditional bilateral military 
exercise ‘Cobra Cold’ between Thailand and the USA. Malaysia may join 
next year.  
Japan, by its own standards, is in the midst of a ‘revolution‘ in terms of  
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its future regional security and defence policies. In February 2000, the 
Japanese foreign ministry announced that Tokyo would be willing to 
contribute armed coastguard vessels to multinational anti-piracy patrols in 
the Malacca Straits.136 Japan has thus interpreted its constitutional notion 
of ‘self-defence‘ as including waters more than 2,000 miles away from 
Tokyo. The steady extension of the defence perimeter mirrors the 
strategic importance of SLOCs and the South China Sea for the 
economic survival of Japan as well as the increasing strategic and 
geopolitical rivalry with China in East Asia and beyond. The October 1999 
hijacking of a large Japanese vessel by pirates and increasing economic 
and political instability in Indonesia have underscored the need for 
outside assistance to cope with the threat of piracy in the region. To 
counter historical anti-Japanese sentiments and mistrust in Southeast 
Asia, Japan will dispatch less-conspicuous, civilian-controlled coastguard 
vessels of its Maritime Safety Agency instead of regular military vessels 
of its Self-Defence Forces. Contrasting with past practice, several 
Southeast Asian governments have accepted the offer, thus also 
signalling a concern with maintaining the regional balance of powers. 
India, too, appears determined to counterbalance China‘s increasing 
influence and has established an informal but deepening security-co-
operation with Japan and Vietnam.137 These remarkable developments 
indicate that the strategic rivalry have increased between China and 
Japan as well as between China and India. 
Tokyo‘s ongoing search for a future role in the region, presently 
reflected in an unprecedented debate over the possible revision of the 
anti-militaristic and pacifistic Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution,138 is a 
sign that Japan has been slowly coming to grips with a reality it used to 
deny: ‘It (Japan) is a great power with strategic interests as pressing as 
its economic ones.‘139 
Against this background, and given China’s suspicion of a redefined 
US-Japan alliance, Washington and Tokyo need to demonstrate that their 
pact aims to preserve regional peace and stability rather than contain the 
PRC. In this respect, and considering Japan’s repeated efforts to involve 
Beijing in closer bilateral and multilateral security dialogues, Asean can 
play a useful role in reassuring China that the re-definition of the alliance 
is in the interest of the entire region and not specifically directed against 
China. Beijing, in turn, has to recognise that disputes with Taiwan are an 
internal matter only as long as they do not turn violent and affect the 
security interests of other neighbouring countries. 
Ultimately, however, regional stability will depend on a strong and  
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sustained US engagement, including the maintenance of substantial 
political, economic, and military means as well as stability in the Japan-
China-US triangle at a a time when all three operate from positions of 
relative strength. In this context, the US-Japan alliance will remain the 
linchpin of Asean’s stability, Japan’s security in general; and preservation, 
for the time being, of Japan’s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s non-nuclear 
weapon status. 
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